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Abstract. The typical approach to steganography is to compress the covert data in order to 
limit its size, which is reasonable in the context of a limited steganographic bandwidth. 
TranSteg (Trancoding Steganography) is a new IP telephony steganographic method that was 
recently proposed that offers high steganographic bandwidth while retaining good voice 
quality. In TranSteg, compression of the overt data is used to make space for the steganogram. 
In this paper we focus on analyzing the influence of the selection of speech codecs on hidden 
transmission performance, that is, which codecs would be the most advantageous ones for 
TranSteg. Therefore, by considering the codecs which are currently most popular for IP 
telephony we aim to find out which codecs should be chosen for transcoding to minimize the 
negative influence on voice quality while maximizing the obtained steganographic bandwidth. 
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1. Introduction 
Steganography is an ancient art that encompasses various information hiding techniques, whose aim is to embed 
a secret message (steganogram) into a carrier of this message. Steganographic methods are aimed at hiding the 
very existence of the communication, and therefore any third-party observers should remain unaware of the 
presence of the steganographic exchange. Steganographic carriers have evolved throughout the ages and are 
related to the evolution of the methods of communication between people. Thus, it is not surprising that 
currently telecommunication networks are a natural target for steganography. The type of modern steganography 
that utilizes network protocols and/or relationships between them as the carrier for steganograms to enable 
hidden communication is called network steganography. 
IP telephony is one of the most important services in the IP world and is changing the entire 
telecommunications landscape. It is a real-time service which enables users to make phone calls through IP data 
networks. An IP telephony connection consists of two phases, in which certain types of traffic are exchanged 
between the calling parties: signaling and conversation phases. In the first phase certain signaling protocol 
messages, for example SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) messages [27], are exchanged between the caller and 
callee. These messages are intended to set up and negotiate the connection parameters between the calling 
parties. In the latter phase two audio streams are sent bidirectionally. RTP (Real-Time Transport Protocol) [29] 
is most often utilized for voice data transport, and thus packets that carry voice payload are called RTP packets. 
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The consecutive RTP packets form an RTP stream. Due to the popularity of IP telephony, as well as the large 
volume of data and the variety of protocols involved, it is currently attracting the attention of the research 
community as a perfect carrier for steganographic purposes [18].  
TranSteg (Transcoding Steganography) is a new steganographic method that has been introduced recently in 
[39]. It is intended for a broad class of multimedia and real-time applications, but its main foreseen application is 
IP telephony. TranSteg can also be exploited in other applications or services (like video streaming), wherever a 
possibility exists to efficiently compress (in a lossy or lossless manner) the overt data. The typical approach to 
steganography is to compress the covert data in order to limit its size (it is reasonable in the context of a limited 
steganographic bandwidth). In TranSteg, compression of the overt data is used to make space for the 
steganogram. TranSteg is based on the general idea of transcoding (lossy compression) of the voice data from a 
higher bit rate codec (and thus greater voice payload size) to a lower bit rate codec (with smaller voice payload 
size) with the least possible degradation in voice quality.  
In [39] a proof of concept implementation of TranSteg was subjected to experimental evaluation to verify 
whether it is feasible. The obtained experimental results proved that it offers a high steganographic bandwidth 
(up to 32 kbit/s) while introducing delays lower than 1 ms and still retaining good voice quality. 
In this paper we focus on analyzing how the selection of speech codecs impacts hidden transmission 
performance, that is, which codecs would be the most advantageous ones for TranSteg. Therefore, the main 
contribution of the paper is to establish, by considering the codecs for IP telephony which are currently most 
popular, which speech codecs should be chosen for transcoding to minimize the negative influence on the hidden 
data carrier (voice quality) while maximizing the obtained steganographic bandwidth.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents related work on IP telephony steganography. 
Section 3 describes the functioning of TranSteg and its hidden communication scenarios. Section 4 presents the 
experimental methodology and results obtained. Finally, Section 5 concludes our work. 
 
2. Related Work 
IP telephony as a hidden data carrier can be considered a fairly recent discovery. The proposed steganographic 
methods stem from two distinctive research origins. The first is the well-established image and audio file 
steganography [6], which has given rise to methods which target the digital representation of voice as the carrier 
for hidden data. The second sphere of influence is the so-called covert channels, created in different network 
protocols [1], [24] (a good survey on covert channels, by Zander et al., can be found in [37]); these solutions 
target specific VoIP protocol fields (e.g. signaling protocol – SIP, transport protocol – RTP, or control protocol – 
RTCP) or their behavior. Presently, steganographic methods that can be utilized in telecommunication networks 
are jointly described by the term network steganography, or, specifically, when applied to IP telephony, by the 
term steganophony [18]. 
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The first VoIP steganographic methods to utilize the digital voice signal as a hidden data carrier were 
proposed by Dittmann et al. in 2005 [9]. The authors evaluated the existing audio steganography techniques, 
with a special focus on the solutions which were suitable for IP telephony. This work was further extended and 
published in 2006 in [17]. In [40], an implementation of SteganRTP was described. This tool employed the least 
significant bits (LSB) of the G.711 codec to carry steganograms. Wang and Wu, in [34], also suggested using the 
least significant bits of voice samples to carry secret communication, but here the bits of the steganogram were 
coded using a low rate voice codec, like Speex. In [31], Takahashi and Lee proposed a similar approach and 
presented its proof of concept implementation, Voice over VoIP (Vo2IP), which can establish a hidden 
conversation by embedding compressed voice data into the regular, PCM-based, voice traffic. The authors also 
considered other methods that can be utilized in VoIP steganography, like DSSS (Direct Sequence Spread 
Spectrum), FHSS (Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum), or Echo hiding. In [3], Aoki proposed a 
steganographic method based on the characteristics of PCMU (Pulse Code Modulation) in which the zeroth 
speech sample can be represented by two codes due to the overlap. Another LSB-based method was proposed by 
Tian et al. in [33]. The authors incorporated the m-sequence technique to eliminate the correlation among secret 
messages to resist statistical detection. A similar approach, also LSB-based, relying on adaptive VoIP 
steganography was presented by the same authors in [32]; a proof of concept tool, StegTalk, was also developed. 
In [36] Xu and Yang proposed an LSB-based method dedicated to voice transmission using the G.723.1 codec in 
5.3 kbps mode. They identified five least significant bits in various G.723.1 parameters and used them to 
transmit hidden data; the method provided a steganographic bandwidth of 133.3 bps. In [23] Miao and Huang 
presented an adaptive steganography scheme based on the smoothness of the speech block. Such an approach 
proved to give better results in terms of voice quality than the LSB-based method. An interesting study is 
described in [26], where Nishimura proposed hiding information in the AMR-coded stream by using an extended 
quantization-based method of pitch delay (one of the AMR codec parameters). This additional data transmission 
channel was used to extend the audio bandwidth from narrow-band (0.3–3.4 kHz) to wide-band (0.3–7.5 kHz). 
Utilization of the VoIP-specific protocols as a steganogram carrier was first proposed by Mazurczyk and 
Kotulski in 2006 [19]. The authors proposed using covert channels and watermarking to embed control 
information (expressed as different parameters) into VoIP streams. The unused bits in the header fields of IP, 
UDP, and RTP protocols were utilized to carry the type of parameter, while the actual parameter value is 
embedded as a watermark into the voice data. The parameters are used to bind control information, including 
data authentication, to the current VoIP data flow. In [21] and [22] Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski described 
network steganography methods that can be applied to VoIP: to its signaling protocol, SIP (with SDP), and to its 
RTP streams (also with RTCP). They discovered that a combination of information hiding solutions provides a 
capacity to covertly transfer about 2000 bits during the signaling phase of a connection and about 2.5 kbit/s 
during the conversation phase. In [22], a novel method called LACK (Lost Audio Packets Steganography) was 
introduced; it was later described and analyzed in [20] and [18]. LACK relies on the modification of both the 
content of the RTP packets and their time dependencies. This method takes advantage of the fact that, in typical 
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multimedia communication protocols like RTP, excessively delayed packets are not used for the reconstruction 
of the transmitted data at the receiver; that is, the packets are considered useless and discarded. Thus, hidden 
communication is possible by introducing intentional delays into selected RTP packets and substituting the 
original payload with a steganogram.  
Bai et al. [4] proposed a covert channel based on the jitter field of the RTCP header. This is performed in two 
stages: firstly, statistics of the value of the jitter field in the current network are calculated. Then, the secret 
message is modulated into the jitter field according to the previously calculated parameters. Utilization of such 
modulation guarantees that the characteristic of the covert channel is similar to that of the overt one. In [8], 
Forbes proposed a new RTP-based steganographic method that modifies the timestamp value of the RTP header 
to send steganograms. The method’s theoretical maximum steganographic bandwidth is 350 bit/s. 
The TranSteg technique that was first introduced in [39] is a development of the last of the discussed groups 
of steganographic methods for VoIP, originating from covert channels. Compared to the existing solutions, its 
main advantages are a high steganographic bandwidth, low steganographic cost (i.e. little degradation of voice 
quality), and difficult detection.  
 
3. TranSteg Functioning 
TranSteg, like every steganographic method, can be described by the following set of characteristics: its 
steganographic bandwidth, its undetectability, and the steganographic cost. The term “steganographic 
bandwidth” refers to the amount of secret data that can be sent per time unit when using a particular method. 
Undetectability is defined as the inability to detect a steganogram within a certain carrier. The most popular way 
to detect a steganogram is to analyze statistical properties of the captured data and compare them with the typical 
values for that carrier. Lastly, the steganographic cost characterizes the degradation of the carrier caused by the 
application of the steganographic method. In the case of TranSteg, this cost can be expressed by providing a 
measure of the conversation quality degradation induced by transcoding and the introduction of an additional 
delay. 
The general idea behind TranSteg is as follows (Fig. 1). RTP packets carrying user’s voice are inspected and 
the codec originally used for speech encoding (here called the overt codec) is determined by analyzing the PT 
(Payload Type) field in the RTP header (Fig. 1, 1). If typical transcoding occurs then the original voice frames 
are usually recoded using a different speech codec to achieve a smaller voice frame (Fig. 1, 2). But in TranSteg 
an appropriate covert codec for the overt codec used originally is selected. The application of the covert codec 
yields a comparable voice quality but a smaller voice payload size than originally. Next, the voice stream is 
transcoded, but the original, large voice payload size and the codec type indicator are preserved, and thus the PT 
field is left unchanged. Instead, after placing the transcoded voice of a smaller size inside the original payload 
field, the remaining free space is filled with hidden data (Fig. 1, 3). Of course, the steganogram does not 
necessarily need to be inserted at the end of the payload field. It can be spread across this field or mixed with 
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voice data as well. We assume that for the purposes of this paper it is not crucial which steganogram spreading 
mechanism is used, and thus it is out of the scope of this work. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Frame bearing voice payload encoded with overt codec (1), typically transcoded (2), and encoded with covert codec 
(3) 
 
The performance of TranSteg depends, most notably, on the characteristics of the pair of codecs: the overt 
codec originally used to encode user speech and the covert codec utilized for transcoding. In ideal conditions the 
covert codec should: 
• not significantly degrade user voice quality when compared to the quality of the overt codec (in an ideal 
situation there should be no negative influence at all),  
• provide the smallest achievable voice payload size, as this results in the most free space in an RTP 
packet to convey a steganogram. 
 
On the other hand, the overt codec in an ideal situation should: 
• result in the largest possible voice payload size to provide, together with the covert codec, the highest 
achievable steganographic bandwidth, 
• be commonly used, to avoid arousing suspicion. 
 
TranSteg can be utilized in four hidden communication scenarios (Fig. 2). The first scenario (S1 in Fig. 2) is 
the most common and typically the most desired: the sender and the receiver conduct a VoIP conversation while 
simultaneously exchanging steganograms (end-to-end). The conversation path is identical to the hidden data path. 
In the next three scenarios (marked S2–S4 in Fig. 2) only a part of the VoIP end-to-end path is used for hidden 
communication. As a result of actions undertaken by intermediate nodes, the sender and/or the receiver are, in 
principle, unaware of the steganographic data exchange. The application of TranSteg in IP telephony 
connections offers a chance to preserve users’ conversation and simultaneously transfer steganograms. As noted 
previously, this is especially important for scenarios S2–S4. 
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Fig. 2: Hidden communication scenarios for TranSteg 
 
In this paper, we consider TranSteg in scenario S4 because it is the worst case scenario in terms of the speech 
quality, as it requires triple transcoding (and two transcodings result from the TranSteg functioning). If TranSteg 
scenarios S1–S3 were applied, we would avoid one or even two (in scenario S1) transcodings, and therefore the 
negative influence on speech quality would be lower than presented in this study.  
In scenario S4 (Fig. 3) it is assumed that both SS and SR are able to intercept and analyze all RTP packets 
exchanged between the calling parties. Neither SS nor SR is involved in the IP telephony conversation as an 
overt calling party. Thus, it is harder to detect hidden communication between the SS and SR compared to the 
previously described scenarios (since neither is an initiator of the overt traffic). 
In the presented scenario the behavior of SS and SR is similar: they both perform transcoding, SS from overt 
to covert, and SR from covert to overt codecs. The steganogram is exchanged only along the part of the 
communication path where the RTP stream travels “inside” the network – it never reaches the endpoints. The 
steps of the TranSteg scenario for SS are as follows: 
• Step 1: For an incoming RTP stream it transcodes the user’s voice data from the overt to the covert 
codec. 
• Step 2: The transcoded voice payload is placed once again in an RTP packet. The RTP packet’s header 
remains unchanged. 
• Step 3: The remaining free space of the RTP payload field is filled with the steganogram’s bits (and thus 
the original voice payload is erased). 
• Step 4: Checksums in lower layer protocols (UDP checksum and CRC at the data link) are adjusted. 
• Step 5: Modified frames with encapsulated RTP packets are sent to the receiver (SR). 
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Fig. 3: The TranSteg concept, scenario S4 (SS – Steganogram Sender; SR – Steganogram Receiver) 
 
Next, when the altered RTP stream reaches the SR, it performs the following steps: 
• Step 1: It extracts the voice payload and the steganogram from the RTP packets.  
• Step 2: The voice payload is then transcoded from the covert to the overt codec and placed once again in 
consecutive RTP packets. By performing this task the steganogram is overwritten with user voice data. 
The RTP packet’s header remains unchanged. 
• Step 3: Checksums for the lower layer protocols (i.e. the UDP checksum and CRC at the data link, if 
they have been utilized) are adjusted. 
• Step 4: Modified frames with encapsulated RTP packets are sent to the receiver (callee). 
 
The most significant advantage of scenario S4 from Fig. 2 is its potential use of aggregated IP telephony traffic 
to transfer steganograms. If both SS and SR have access to more than one VoIP call then the achievable 
steganographic bandwidth can be significantly increased. 
The SS and SR have limited influence on the choice of the overt codec, because they are both located at some 
intermediate network node. Due to this fact they are bound to rely on the codec chosen by the overt, non-
steganographic calling parties or they can interfere with the choice of the overt codec during the signaling phase 
of the call where the codec negotiation is taking place. When relying on the first option, SS and SR must be able 
to choose the covert codec in such a way as to maximize the achievable steganographic bandwidth while 
minimizing the steganographic cost.  
This paper focuses on analyzing the best covert codec choices for the speech codecs that are currently the most 
popular ones utilized for IP telephony (overt codecs) in terms of steganographic bandwidth and cost. 
 
4. TranSteg Experimental Results 
4.1 Experiment Methodology 
 
8 
 
In our experiments we emulated 20 unidirectional voice transmission channels. We took the information about 
location of speech activity (turn-taking patterns) and background noise from the LUNA corpus [25], containing 
real phone conversations between travelers and a public transport information line. Voice activity ranged from 
40.5% to 67.5%, with an average of 46.5%. The speech signal was taken from the TSPSpeech corpus [16] for 
English and CORPORA [11] for Polish. Each of these databases contains phonetically balanced sentences in the 
respective languages. In such a way we generated 20 one-minute recordings, 10 in English and 10 in Polish, 
sampled at 8 kHz with 16-bit resolution. Each language group consisted of five male and five female speakers.  
 
As the overt codec we used four of the most popular codecs used in the Internet telephony [41], [42]: 
• G.711: a codec designed originally for fixed telephony [13], but also used in VoIP due to its simplicity 
and good speech quality; it is just an implementation of logarithmic quantization with 8 bits per sample, 
thus offering a bitrate of 64 kbps. The option A-law, which is used most in the world, was researched in 
this study. 
• Speex: a CELP (Code Excited Linear Prediction)-based lossy codec designed specifically for VoIP 
applications [35]. Although it allows wide-band and ultra-band transmissions, only the narrow-band 
variant was considered here. It offers 10 different compression levels corresponding to 10 different 
bitrates, of which three modes were selected: (i) mode 7, the highest mode designed for speech, working 
with a bitrate of 24.6 kbps, hereinafter called Speex(7), (ii) a moderate mode 4, requiring a bitrate of 
11.0 kbps, hereinafter called Speex(4), and (iii) mode 2, which is the lowest recommended mode for 
speech, working at 5.95 kbps, called here Speex(2). 
• iLBC: another low-bitrate CELP-based codec designed for VoIP, using frame-independent long term 
prediction, thus making it resistant to packet losses [2]. Depending on the analysis frame length (20 ms 
or 30 ms), it requires 15.2 kbps or 13.33 kbps, respectively. Twenty-millisecond frames were used in 
this study. 
• G.723.1: a codec based on MP-MLQ (Multi-Pulse Maximum Likelihood Quantization) and ACELP 
(Algebraic CELP), offering bitrates of 5.3 kbps and 6.4 kbps, respectively. In this study the latter option 
was used. 
 
As for the covert codecs, apart from the abovementioned ones, we tested the following: 
• G.711.0: also known as G.711 LLC (LossLess Compression), is a lossless extension of the G.711 codec, 
standardized by ITU fairly recently in 2009 [12]. It works with various frame lengths (40–320 samples); 
however in this study 160-sample (20 ms) frames were used. Due to its losslessness it offers a variable 
bitrate, as the compression ratio depends on the actual voice data. It is also stateless, which means that 
the encoding of a particular frame does not depend on the previous or the next frame, making it suitable 
for packet transmission, including the TranSteg technique. 
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• G.726: an ADPCM (Adaptive Differential PCM) codec, standardized by ITU-T in 1990 [7], offering 
bitrates from 16 kbps up to 40 kbps. In this study we used the most common option, 32 kbps, which was 
already tried with TranSteg in [39]. 
• GSM 06.10 [10] (also known as GSM Full-Rate or GSM-FR): designed in the early 1990s for the GSM 
telephony, but used in VoIP as well. It is based on the RPE-LTP (Regular Pulse Excitation – Long Term 
Prediction) algorithm, with the use of the LPC technique.  
• AMR (Adaptive Multi-Rate): a codec adopted in 1999 as standard by 3GPP, used widely in GSM and 
UMTS [28]. It is based on CELP, but also incorporates other techniques, such as DTX (Discontinuous 
Transmission) and CNG (Comfort Noise Generation). It covers eight different bitrates, from 4.75 kbps 
up to 12.2 kbps. The highest 12.2 kbps mode, used further in this study, is compatible with ETSI GSM 
EFR (Enhanced Full-Rate). 
• G.729: operates at a bitrate of 8 kbps, and is based on CS-ACELP (Conjugate Structure ACELP). 
Several annexes to the basic G.729 have been published so far. In this study we used Annex A, which 
has slightly lower computational requirements than the original G.729. 
 
To sum up, we tested codecs from various families: waveform codecs, that is, the ones preserving the speech 
signal shape (G.711, G.726), CELP-based codes, that is, the ones based on linear prediction excited by vectors 
from a codebook (Speex, iLBC, G.723.1, AMR), an RPE-LTP codec (GSM 06.10) and, last but not least, a 
lossless audio codec (G.711.0). 
Emulations were conducted in the Matlab® 7.12 environment. The codecs’ functionality was implemented 
using the SoX toolbox version 14.3.2 [30], the G.723.1 Speech Coder and Decoder MATLAB toolbox, and 
reference implementations provided by ITU-T and iLBCfreeware.org. 
Speech quality was assessed using the PESQ algorithm [14], by comparing the original and output audio files 
(see Fig. 4). As a reference, first the single transcoding was emulated (configuration A). Later, the double one 
was tried, but still without the covert transcoding (configuration B). The experiments with the actual choice of 
overt and covert codecs were run in configuration C, which emulates TranSteg operation in scenario S4. This 
scenario requires triple transcoding. The PESQ algorithm returned MOS-LQO (Mean Opinion Score – Listening 
Quality Objective) results, which were further averaged over all the tested signals. In addition, the confidence 
interval at the confidence level of 95% was calculated. 
Additionally, for the lossless covert codec G.711.0 we measured the bitrate, as it is a variable bitrate codec. 
We assumed that in configurations with G.711.0 as the covert codec, one byte in the payload field will be used 
for signaling to inform how many bytes in a given packet are used for the overt transmission. 
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Fig. 4: The experimental setup 
 
4.2 Experimental Results 
 
4.2.1 Results for Steganographic Bandwidth 
We calculated the steganographic bandwidth for all pairs of overt and covert codecs considered. The results, 
presented in  
Table I, are based on the bitrate required by the overt and covert codecs. The result for the G.711/G.711.0 
(overt/covert) pair was obtained experimentally by measuring the bitrate of the lossless G.711.0. For the 20 
tested signals it ranged between 22.77 kbps and 37.83 kbps, giving an average of 31.11 kbps, with a standard 
deviation of 3.67 kbps. The steganographic bandwidth in this case takes into account the signaling bits (8 bits per 
20-ms frame). 
 
Table I. Steganographic bandwidth [kbps] for various sets of overt and covert codecs (unfeasible combinations are grayed 
out). An asterisk (*) denotes the result with a confidence interval of ±2.27 kbps at the 95% confidence level. The top three 
results are bolded. 
Co
v
er
t c
o
de
c 
G.711 64 
    
 
 
G.711.0 32.49* 31.11* 
   
 
 
G.726 32 32 
   
 
 
Speex(7) 24.6 39.4 
   
 
 
iLBC 15.2 48.8 9.4 
  
 
 
GSM 06.10 13 51 11.6 2.2 
 
 
 
AMR 12.2 51.8 12.4 3 
 
 
 
Speex(4) 11 53 13.6 4.2 
 
 
 
G.729 8 56 16.6 7.2 3  
 
G.723.1 6.3 57.7 18.3 8.9 4.7  
 
Speex(2) 5.95 58.05 18.65 9.25 5.05 0.35 
 
 
Bitrate [kbps] 64 24.6 15.2 11 6.3 5.95 
 
Codec 
 
G.711 Speex(7) iLBC Speex(4) G.723.1 Speex(2) 
   
Overt codec 
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The pairs in which the covert codec required a higher bandwidth than the overt one were found to be 
unfeasible in the TranSteg technique and were therefore excluded from further experiments (in  
Table I they are grayed out). It is worth noting that the steganographic bandwidth depends strongly on the 
codec used in the overt channel – it is the highest for G.711, ranging from 32 kbps up to 58.08 kbps, whilst it is 
the lowest for G.723.1, Speex(4), and iLBC, allowing only a few kilobits per second. When the overt 
transmission uses Speex(2), steganographic transmission using the TranSteg technique is not possible at all, due 
to the low overt transmission bitrate (5.95 kbps). Considering only the bitrate, it turned out that the codecs 
G.711.0, G.726, and Speex(7) can serve as covert codecs only when the overt voice transmission is using G.711. 
 
4.2.2 Results for Steganographic Cost 
The TranSteg technique requires the speech signal to be transcoded twice with the overt codec. The experiments 
were run to verify how much single and double transcoding (configurations A and B in Fig. 4) impacts the voice 
transmission quality without utilizing a covert codec yet. The results in Table II show that G.711 was the most 
resistant against double transcoding. This is due to the fact that G.711 is a waveform codec. All the remaining, 
CELP-based codecs yielded decreases in quality ranging from 0.24 MOS for iLBC to 0.51 MOS for Speex(4). 
 
Table II. Initial voice transmission quality [MOS] – no TranSteg used 
 
Codec G.711 Speex(7) iLBC Speex(4) G.723.1 
Single transcoding 4.46 4.17 3.92 3.62 3.70 
Double transcoding 4.46 3.92 3.68 3.11 3.24 
 
 
 
Table III presents the results of overall voice quality of the output speech signal for all the tested 
configurations with emulated TranSteg (configuration C in Fig. 4). It shows that most of the pairs retained an 
acceptable level of quality – more than 3 in the MOS scale; some pairs with G.711 as the overt codec yielded 
results even higher than 4, which is considered “more than good”. However, the configurations with G.723.1 and 
Speex(4) as the overt codec provided voice quality lower than 3, which was found to be unacceptably low. It is 
noteworthy that the overall quality obtained with the G.711/G.711.0 configuration is the same as for G.711 
without TranSteg, as shown in Table II. 
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Table III. Overall voice quality [MOS] for various sets of overt and covert codecs (unfeasible combinations are grayed out). 
The best results (greater than 4 MOS) are highlighted; the worst ones (less than 3 MOS) are italicized. 
Co
v
er
t c
o
de
c 
G.711 
     
G.711.0 4.46 
    
G.726 4.04 
    
Speex(7) 4.11 
    
iLBC 3.88 3.66 
   
GSM 06.10 3.60 3.41 3.34 
  
AMR 4.10 3.73 3.46 
  
Speex(4) 3.59 3.27 3.28 
  
G.729 3.72 3.43 3.26 2.76 
 
G.723.1 3.65 3.43 3.29 2.80 
 
Speex(2) 3.27 3.04 3.08 2.57 2.71 
Codec G.711 Speex(7) iLBC Speex(4) G.723.1 
  
Overt codec 
 
Having measured the overall quality with TranSteg and compared it with the initial values, we were able to 
calculate the steganographic cost introduced by various configurations. The results are shown in Table IV. The 
cost for G.711/G.711.0 was obviously equal to zero, due to the lossless nature of the covert codec. When lossy 
codecs were used as covert ones, the steganographic cost ranged from as low as around 0.35 MOS for 
G.711/Speex(7) and G.711/AMR pairs up to around 1.2 MOS for G.711/Speex(2) and Speex(7)/Speex(2) pairs. 
The confidence interval for the 20 tested signals, assuming a 95% confidence level, turned out to be acceptably 
narrow (see Table IV), being usually far below ± 0.1 MOS (with only one exception, for G.711/GSM 06.10, 
where it yielded ± 0.104). 
 
Table IV. Results of steganographic cost [MOS] for the tested variants, with confidence intervals (at 95% confidence level). 
The best results (less than 0.5 MOS) are highlighted; the worst ones (greater than 1 MOS) are italicized. 
Co
v
er
t c
o
de
c 
G.711 
     
G.711.0 0.00 ± 0.000 
    
G.726 0.42 ± 0.067 
    
Speex(7) 0.35 ± 0.052 
    
iLBC 0.59 ± 0.052 0.50 ± 0.055 
   
GSM 06.10 0.86 ± 0.104 0.76 ± 0.086 0.58 ± 0.079 
  
AMR 0.36 ± 0.039 0.43 ± 0.059 0.46 ± 0.069 
  
Speex(4) 0.88 ± 0.069 0.90 ± 0.064 0.64 ± 0.074 
  
G.729 0.74 ± 0.066 0.74 ± 0.074 0.66 ± 0.070 0.86 ± 0.088 
 
G.723.1 0.81 ± 0.059 0.74 ± 0.065 0.63 ± 0.074 0.82 ± 0.089 
 
Speex(2) 1.20 ± 0.067 1.13 ± 0.074 0.84 ± 0.083 1.04 ± 0.074 0.99 ± 0.087 
 
Codec G.711 Speex(7) iLBC Speex(4) G.723.1 
  
Overt codec 
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4.2.3 Steganographic Cost versus Steganographic Bandwidth 
Figure 5 shows graphically the steganographic cost of various tested configurations against the offered 
steganographic bandwidth. It can be observed that, for a given overt codec, a choice of the most efficient covert 
codec in the TranSteg technique is often (but not always) a matter of a trade-off between the steganographic 
bandwidth and the steganographic cost. For example, with iLBC in the overt channel, in the covert channel we 
can use AMR, offering 3 kbps steganographic bandwidth with only 0.43 MOS of steganographic cost. If we 
choose Speex(2), TranSteg will create a 9.25 kbps steganographic channel, but at the expense of a higher cost: 
0.84 MOS. 
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Fig. 5: Steganographic cost against the steganographic bandwidth for the tested overt/covert codec pairs. The labels 
inform about the covert codec. 
 
As the decrease in the acceptable level of voice quality depends on an actual application and user 
requirements, we took the liberty of dividing the results in Fig. 5 into three classes: 
• Class 0: no quality decrease; for configurations with steganographic cost lower than 0.1 MOS; 
• Class 1: minor quality decrease; for configurations with steganographic cost between 0.1 and 0.5 MOS; 
• Class 2: moderate quality decrease; for configurations with steganographic cost between 0.5 and 1.0 
MOS. 
 
The configurations with costs above 1.0 MOS are outside the picture, as we consider such a major decrease of 
voice quality in TranSteg to be unacceptable. 
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It must be emphasized that a high steganographic bandwidth does not always imply a high steganographic cost. 
For example, with G.711 in the overt channel we can use either GSM 06.10, Speex(4), or AMR in the covert 
channel, creating in each case a similar, capacious (ca. 50 kbps) steganographic channel. But GSM 06.10 and 
Speex(4) will cause a decrease of more than 0.85 MOS in the voice quality, while, remarkably, AMR will 
introduce a steganographic cost of only 0.36 MOS.  
The experiments we ran helped to identify which codecs would provide better quality while providing similar 
bandwidth (or provide higher bandwidth while assuring similar quality). As a result, the configurations which we 
recommend in each class are underlined in Fig. 5. For example, for all the tested overt codecs, AMR introduced 
a much lower decrease in quality than GSM 06.10, even though they provide similar bandwidths. For iLBC in 
the overt channel, the recommended covert codecs are AMR and G.723.1, whilst the codecs Speex(4) and G.729 
would provide lower steganographic bandwidth at a similar steganographic cost. The pairs which provided 
overall quality lower than 3 MOS (i.e. the ones with Speex(4) and G.723.1 as the overt codecs) are not 
recommended. 
In general, we recommend only one pair in Class 0 (G.711 with lossless G.711.0), four pairs in Class 1, and 
five pairs in Class 2.  
 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
TranSteg is a new steganographic method dedicated to multimedia services like IP telephony. In this paper the 
analysis of the influence of the selection of speech codecs on the performance of TranSteg hidden transmission 
was presented. By considering the codecs which are currently most popular for IP telephony we wanted to find 
out which codecs should be chosen for transcoding to minimize the negative influence on hidden data carriers 
while maximizing the obtained steganographic bandwidth. 
The obtained experimental results show that TranSteg is most effective when G.711 is used for the overt 
transmission. We think that this is caused by several factors:  
• high G.711 bitrate, so there is more space for hidden data;  
• high speech quality offered by G.711; 
• G.711 performs well if transcoded more than once (see Table II), which we think is due to the fact that 
G.711 is a waveform codec; that is, it preserves the waveform shape; 
• while being a waveform codec, G.711 behaves well if further transcoded with other codecs, especially 
CELP-based ones (AMR, Speex in mode 7). 
 
Therefore, when it is possible to select an overt codec (e.g., by imposing it in codec negotiation in scenario 
S3), G.711 is the best option. In contrast, Speex in the low mode (4) and G.723.1 as the overt codecs turned out 
to provide too low overall quality when cascaded with any of the covert codecs, and therefore should be avoided 
in TranSteg in overt transmission. 
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When experimenting with various combinations of overt and covert codecs, we observed that some codecs do 
not complement each other well. For example, Speex in mode 7 works significantly better (in terms of voice 
quality) with AMR than with GSM 06.10, even though the two TranSteg configurations result in similar 
steganographic bandwidths. A similar phenomenon was observed in other research projects, for example in 
speaker recognition from coded speech, in situations where there was a mismatch between the codec used in 
voice transmission and the codec used to create speakers’ models [15]. 
The choice of a covert codec depends on an actual application, or more precisely, on whether priority is given 
to higher steganographic bandwidth or better speech quality. We recommended 10 pairs of overt/covert codecs 
which can be used effectively in TranSteg in various conditions depending on the required steganographic 
bandwidth, allowed steganographic cost, and the codec used in the overt transmission. We grouped those pairs 
into three classes based on the steganographic cost. The pair G.711/G.711.0 is costless; nevertheless it offers a 
remarkably high steganographic bandwidth, on average more than 31 kbps. However caution must be taken, as 
the G.711.0 bitrate is variable and depends on an actual signal being transmitted in the overt channel. 
Codec AMR working in 12.2 kbps mode proved to be very efficient as the covert codec in TranSteg. This is a 
low bitrate codec which does not significantly degrade the quality: the steganographic cost ranged between 0.36 
and 0.46 MOS. 
In this research we showed results for scenario S4, which is the worst case scenario in terms of the speech 
quality, as it requires triple transcoding. If TranSteg scenarios S1–S3 were applied, we would avoid one or even 
two (in scenario S1) transcodings, and therefore steganographic cost would be lower than presented in this study.  
Future work will include the development of the TranSteg-capable softphone, which will include results 
related to speech codec selection presented in this paper. Moreover, effective and efficient TranSteg detection 
methods will be pursued. 
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